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Attachment In California-What Now?
EDWARD N. JACKSON*
The California supreme court has recently declared California's
prejudgment statute unconstitutional. The court's decision is the
most recent in a series of cases which have concluded that the in-
terference with an individual's property, prior to judgment and
without notice and an opportunity to be heard, is a violation of
due process. Mr. Jackson, one of the most eminent attorneys in
the field of debt collection practice, briefly discusses the attach-
ment procedures in other states and identifies the competing in-
terests of creditors and debtors. The author then analyzes the
court's decision in Randone v. Superior Court of Sacramento
County, [5 Cal. 3d 536 (1971)] and suggests an attachment pro-
cedure which will satisfy due process requirements and accommodate
the interest of both the creditor and debtor.
The California supreme court unanimously ruled today that
property, including bank accounts, cannot be attached by a creditor
before judgment, without a hearing. Holding that the 99-year old
attachment statute violated both the California and Federal Consti-
tutions, the Court stated that it did no more than follow the 1969
Supreme Court decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corpora-
tion which struck down a Wisconsin statute permitting garnish-
ment of wages without prior notice and hearing.'
The latest in a long line of decisions, Randone v. Appellate De-
* A.B. University of California, Berkeley; J.D. University of California, Hast-
ings College of Law. Member, California Bar; Past President of the Lawyers Club of
San Francisco. Author of CALIFORNI DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE, a Continuing
Education of the Bar Practice Book.
1. Administrative Office of the Courts Press Release (August 26, 1971).
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partment2 is certain to alter debt collection practice in California and
perhaps in other jurisdictions where the decisions of our supreme court
are regarded as the highest of respectable authority. For example, the
Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services which licenses and
supervises collection agencies in California8 issued an emergency bul-
letin immediately following the decision in Randone urging its li-
censees to review collection practices in light of Randone.4 The Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission, planning to submit a comprehen-
sive recommendation to the 1972 Legislature dealing with wage garnish-
ment and related matters, issued its Memorandum in which Nathaniel
Sterling, Legal Counsel to the Commission, comes to this conclusion:
Randone appears to have completely wiped out California's at-
tachment statutes and practice, both because the statutes allow
seizure of necessities of life without a hearing on the validity of
the creditor's claim and because they allow seizure of assets gen-
erally rather than in extraordinary circumstances. It appears that
the statutes cannot be construed to be constitutional and that, if
attachment is to be used, it may occur only under a substantially
revised statutory scheme. 5
It is the purpose of this article to review the remedy of attachment,
to scrutinize the objections made in Randone, and to suggest a solu-
tion which can be adopted as an interim measure.
THE ATTACHMENT PROCESS
Attachment is one of seven provisional remedies available in Cali-
fornia in civil actions. 6  It affords an ancillary remedy by which a
creditor may have property of a defendant sequestered as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment the creditor might recover against the
defendant.7 The remedy is purely statutory8 and the provisions of the
statute must be strictly followed.9
The plaintiff, at the time of issuing the summons, or at any time
afterward, may have the property of the defendant attached in the fol-
lowing cases:
1. In an action upon contract, express or implied, for the direct
payment of money;10
2. 5 Cal. 3d 536 (1971).
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§6850 et seq.
4. September, 1971 Administrative Bulletin #15.
5. Third Supplement to Memorandum 71-58, September 3, 1971.
6. Title VII CAL. CODE CiV. PRoC.
7. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537.
8. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§537-561.
9. Halstead v. Halstead, 72 Cal. App. 2d 832 (1946).
10. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537.1.
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2. In contract actions against nonresidents;"'
3. In an action against a nonresident to recover damages for in-
juries to person or property in this state;12
4. In an action in unlawful detainer;' 3
5. In an action by the State for the collection of taxes; 4 and
6. In an action by the State to recover funds paid by police officers
in the process of a narcotics investigation.' 5
An attachment may likewise be issued in connection with actions to
foreclose imechanics liens' 6 and in actions for damages for conversion
of personal property.",
Procedure
The procedure for the attachment of the debtor's property is briefly
as follows:
The plaintiff must file with the clerk of the court, or the judge if
there is no clerk, a declaration showing that an attachment is proper un-
der the circumstances of the particular case.' 8 At the same time,
the plaintiff must file an undertaking 9 with two or more sufficient
sureties20 or a corporate surety2 or, in lieu of sureties, a cash deposit,
22
"to the effect that plaintiff will pay all costs that may be awarded to
the defendant and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment. '23 The sum specified in the undertaking is one-half of the
principal for which the writ is to be issued, but not less than $50.24
Upon receipt of the declaration and undertaking the clerk issues
a writ of attachment to a levying officer, 25 which directs him to "at-
tach and safely keep" the property of the defendant, not exempt from ex-
ecution, sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's demand. 20
The code specifies the manner in which property, according to its
11. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537.2.
12. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §537.3.
13. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537.4.
14. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537.5.
15. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §537.6.
16. Beltinger Lumber Co. v. Kerrin, 99 Cal. App. 686 (1929).
17. Warner Mfg. Co. v. Standard I.M. Co., 97 Cal. App. 2d 494 (1950).
18. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §538.
19. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §539.
20. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1057.
21. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1056.
22. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §1054a.
23. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §539.
24. Id.
25. The levying officer in a county is the sheriff; in a city, the marshal; and
in a township, a constable.
26. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §540.
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nature, may be attached,27 and further provides that if judgment be
awarded, the property attached may be sold to satisfy the judgment. 28
Personal property in the possession of the defendant, must be at-
tached by the levying officer by taking it into custody.20 For example,
the defendant's automobile would be seized by the sheriff and placed in
storage.
Debts, credits and other personal property not capable of manual
delivery are attached by levying with the person owing the debt, or
having in his possession or under his control the credits or other per-
sonal property, a notice that such property belonging to the defendant
is attached pursuant to the writ. 0 Thus, earnings of the judgment debtor
are attached by the levy upon his employer and money in a bank
account is attached by the levy upon the banking institution. Such
levies on third parties are called "garnishments"; the third party in
possession or control of the property of the defendant is known as the
"garnishee".
History
This summary procedure has been available in California even be-
fore statehood. 3' Originally it was available; 1) when the debtor was
not a resident; 2) when the debtor was in various ways attempting to
conceal himself or his property to defraud his creditors; and 3) when
the debt was incurred outside California and the debtor entered
California to defraud his creditors.32
From this relatively simple beginning attachment evolved into the
patchwork it is today. The biggest change occured in 1851 when the
legislature authorized attachments in actions upon a contract, express or
implied, for the direct payment of money when the contract is made or
is payable in California and is not secured." In 1853 a similar provi-
sion was added in contract actions against nonresidents."4
Since that time California has allowed two types of attachment: the
"foreign attachment," against nonresidents, and the "domestic at-
tachment," against residents.35 Each type of attachment has been con-
27. CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. §§541, 542.
28. CAL. CODE CM. PROC. §541.
29. CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. §542.3.
30. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §542.6.
31. See, Background Study Relating to Attachment and Garnishment, CAL. L.
REV'N COMM'N, 1 (October 13, 1970, revised October 22, 1970) [hereinafter cited as
COMM'N STUDY]. The Study was prepared by Professor S. A. Riesenfeld.
32. CAL. STATS. 1849-50, c. 136, §2.
33. CAL. STATS. 1851, c. 5, §120.
34. CAL. STATS. 1853, c. 178, §3.
35. Cobi'N STUDY, at 3.
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tinuously expanded reflecting a tendency to emphasize the interests of
the creditor over the debtor.36  The main protection afforded debtors
related to exemptions. Realizing that there could be substantial injury
to a defendant whose property was attached, and that the seizure of
his property was accomplished before a judgment was rendered against
the defendant (in other words, before a hearing upon the merits of
the plaintiff's claim) the legislature attempted to protect the defendant
not only by requiring the undertaking on attachment, 37 but also by set-
ting up a procedure whereby the defendant could prevent the levy in
the first instance by bonding against it3 s or on motion to discharge the
attachment after levy. 9 In addition, the legislature enumerated cer-
tain property as exempt from attachment or execution, some of which
is exempt without the defendant making a claim for the exemption, and
some of which may be exempted only if the defendant claims the ex-
emption.40
Attachment in Other Jurisdictions
The historical development outlined above left California among the
most permissive states in allowing attachment.4 '
In New Jersey, attachment is an extraordinary writ42 which will issue:
1) where plaintiff would be entitled to an order of arrest before judg-
ment, generally, the plaintiff is entitled to the order in certain aggra-
vated torts, and in contract actions where the debtor has or is attempting
to defraud his creditors;43 2) where defendant absconds or is a non-
resident and cannot be served; and 3) in certain actions involving non-
resident decedent's estates and corporations.44
It should be noted that attachment in New Jersey is an extraordinary
writ requiring judicial scrutiny and that it is authorized only in situ-
ations involving nonresidents or fraudulent conduct on the part of the
debtor.
Illinois likewise allows attachment only when the debtor is a non-
resident or when he has or is about to defraud his creditor by concealing
himself or his property.45 The creditor must file an affidavit detail-
ing various facts about the case; however, he is examined by a judge
only if the action sounds in tort.40
36. Id. at 1.
37. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §539.
38. CAL. CODE Cv. PROC. §540.
39. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§554, 555.
40. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §690 et seq.
41. CoM 'N STUDY, at 14.
42. Russel v. Fred G. Pohl Co., 7 N.J. 32, 80 A.2d 191 (1951).
43. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, §15-41, 15-42.
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, §26-2.
45. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, §1.
46. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, §2.
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Professor Riesenfeld has noted that New York law is noteworthy be-
cause of the fact that
1) attachments are judicial orders.
2) there is no attachment against resident debtors, unless there is
some past or expected fraudulent or opprobrious conduct. The
only exception relates to actions on foreign judgments, but in
this case attachment is really a form of execution. 47
He goes on to comment that "in Pennsylvania likewise domestic at-
tachment is abolished and attachment is either 'foreign attachment'
(nonresident) or 'fraudulent debtor's attachment' .
This brief comparison indicates that other states allow attachment in
two situations: "foreign attachment," where the debtor is a nonresi-
dent, and "domestic attachment," where the debtor is involved in at-
tempting to defraud the creditor. These are the same categories as
found in California law; however, "domestic attachment" in California
is much broader since it includes not only actions against debtors in-
volved in fraudulent conduct, but also any action on an unsecured con-
tract. Because of the latitude allowed creditors in "domestic attach-
ment", California had one of the most liberal attachment statutes.
THE COMPETING INTERESTS INVOLVED
Before reviewing the recent line of due process cases commencing with
Family Finance Co. of Bay View v. Sniadach" and culminating in Ran-
done, it would be useful to analyze the competing interests of the
parties involved in an attachment proceeding."°
"Domestic Attachment"
The creditor's main need for attachment is to provide security for
any money judgment he may be awarded. Although such a judgment
may be enforced by means of a writ of execution, this remedy is value-
less if the debtor has absconded or concealed his nonexempt property
before the writ can be issued. The law of fraudulent conveyances af-
fords no satisfactory protection in this situation since it either does not
apply or the litigation involved is too expensive. 51
Of course, the creditor needs the security provided by attachment
47. COMM'N STUDY at 15. The New York statute is N.Y. Civ. PRoc. §6201.
48. COMM'N STUDY at 16 (footnotes omitted). The Pennsylvania statutes are
PA. RuLES OF Civ. PROC. §§ 1251-1279, 1205-1292, 1461-1462.
49. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
50. See generally, COMM'N STUDy at 7-12; Note, Attachment in California: A
New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1254, 1258-1264 (1970).
51. COMM'N STUDY at 11; 22 STAN. L. REV., supra note 50, at 1259.
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only if the debtor is about to abscond, conceal his property, or other-
wise attempt to defraud the creditor. Thus, this particular need of the
creditor corresponds to the narrower "domestic attachment" found in
other jurisdictions.
Besides the creditor's interest in obtaining security for a possible
judgment, attachment provides the creditor with considerable leverage
in pressing for a settlement of his claim.52  Attachment deprives the
debtor of the use of his property. A keeper may frighten customers or
trade creditors away. A debtor whose wages are garnished may lose
his job. Under these circumstances, a debtor is under great pressure
to settle disputed claims quickly.
If the debtor actually owes the debt, he obviously ought to pay it.
This leverage is arguably beneficial since it encourages him to pay
his just debts promptly. On the other hand, the leverage gained by a
creditor through attachment puts the debtor in a very poor bargaining
position, encouraging him to pay more than he may actually owe
simply to have the attachment removed.
The debtor's interest in paying no more on a claim than a court would
find him to owe certainly should be protected. This leverage may be
justified when the debtor is attempting to defraud his creditor. But
there seems little justification for this leverage when no fraudulent con-
duct is involved and the court can acquire personal jurisdiction over the
debtor. Thus, leverage seems to do the most harm under California's
broader definition of "domestic attachment."
Other considerations also tend to weaken the justification for Califor-
nia's broad "domestic attachment." A debtor's other creditors are af-
fected by attachment by one creditor. The first creditors to attach gain
considerable bargaining strength, since they will have first claim on
substantially all of the debtor's property. The only solution available
to the remaining creditors is to declare bankruptcy within four months
or wait until the debtor has re-acquired assets. Bankruptcy may not be
the best solution however: bankruptcy procedures are expensive for all
concerned; a potentially viable business may not survive; and the
social costs of bankruptcy are well-known.53
Other, more general, interests of the debtor and creditor have been
reviewed elsewhere. 54
"Foreign Attachment'
One of the most important reasons for attachment, traditionally,
52. COMM'N STUDY at 112-12; 22 STAN. L. REV., supra note 50, at 1200-1261.
53. See generally, 22 STAN . L. Rav., supra note 50, at 1263-1264.
54. Id.
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has been its utility in providing quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Despite the
fact that a forum was unable to obtain personal service on, and per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident debtor, the Supreme Court allowed
state courts to obtain jurisdiction as long as property belonging to the
debtor was located within the forum.55 Federal due process was sat-
isfied by: 1) substituted service on the nonresident; and 2) if any
judgment obtained was limited to satisfaction from the assets originally
attached.
This was a direct method of satisfying a nonresident's debt. An-
other, more circuitous method of satisfying the claim has always been
available. The creditor can go into the forum having personal juris-
diction over the debtor, obtain a money judgment, and satisfy the
judgment by supplementary proceedings wherever assets of the debtor
can be found. Probably because of the expense involved in pursuing
this method, it has never been seriously discussed as an alternative to
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 6
The case authorizing this kind of jurisdiction was decided long be-
fore International Shoe Co. v. Washington,5t which formed the basis
for today's long-arm statutes.58  The argument has been raised that
personal service under the long-arm statutes is now so pervasive that
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is no longer necessary.5 9  Professor Ries-
enfeld has reduced the arguments supporting this position to one: in
no case where a nonresident debtor has assets located in the forum will
personal service be unavailable.60 In other words, the mere fact that
a debt may be collected from a nonresident's assets in the forum provides
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum to afford a basis for
personal jurisdiction.
Professor Riesenfeld, however, asserts that this position is "highly
questionable." 61 "Nothing in the more recent decisions of the Supreme
Court expanding the scope of personal jurisdiction authorizes such
extreme latitude."6 He concludes that ". . . [i]n many cases there is
still a need for a quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and for attachment based on
jurisdictional needs."63  Thus it would appear that a legitimate need
for attachment to provide quasi-in-rem jurisdiction still exists, although
55. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
56. COMm'N STnY at 8.
57. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
58. In California, see CAL. CODE Civ. tNoc. §410.10.
59. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HAR .
L. REv. 303 (1962).
60. CoMiXN STUDY at 9-10.
61. Id. at 10.
62. Id.
63. Id.
1972 / Attachment in California-What Now?
it should be limited to situations where personal service under the long-
arm statutes is unavailable, or unavailing (e.g. the code method of serv-
ice by registered air-mail is of little value if the person to whom the
mail is addressed refuses to sign for it).
FRoM SNADACH TO RANDoi
Although the law of attachment had occasionally been attacked on
constitutional grounds, the courts, until recently, reacted compla-
cently. 64
In 1969 the United States Supreme Court decided Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corporation of Bay View. 64a
In Sniadach, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant owed it $240
on a promissory note executed by the defendant. Mrs. Sniadach's wages
were garnished and she was served with proper notice in accordance
with the statutory requirements of the State of Wisconsin. She
moved to dismiss the garnishment proceedings, claiming that she was de-
prived of her property without prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did not find the
garnishment statutes unconstitutional65 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that at least in the case of critical property such as the wages
of a debtor, the deprivation of the use6" thereof is unconstitutional
where the deprivation is made before judgment without notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
The Sniadach decision had an immediate effect across the country.
In California the cases of McCallop v. Carberry67 and Cline v. Credit
Bureau of Santa Clara Valley6s both followed Sniadach by holding un-
constitutional prejudgment garnishment of wages. These decisions
were followed by amendments to the code abolishing prejudgment
attachment of wages. 69 Wisconsin, New Mexico and New Hampshire,
prompted by Sniadach, also adopted the statutes prohibiting prejudg-
ment garnishment of earnings. Section 5.104 of the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code likewise now outlaws prejudgment garnishment of
wages. 70
64. Id. at 18.
64a. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
65. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d
259 (1967).
66. Justice Harlan, concurring in Sniadach, said that "[tlhe property of which
petitioner has been deprived is the use of the garnished portion of her wages during the
interim period between the garnishment and the culmination of the main suit." (Origi-
nal italics). 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
67. 1 Cal. 3d 903 (1970).
68. 1 Cal. 3d 908 (1970).
69. CAL. STATS. 1970 c. 1523; see also 2 PAC. L.J. 319-324 (1971).
70. U.C.C.C. §5.104 (rev. 1969 draft).
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The first major dispute to arise in the wake of Sniadach involved the
kinds of property to which the decision should be extended. The
facts of Sniadach involved wages. It would certainly seem reasonable
to assume that if prejudgment garnishment of wages is an uncon-
stitutional taking, then prejudgment garnishment of other property -un-
der the same circumstances would likewise be unconstitutional. The
Court indicated, however, that its ruling was based squarely upon the
critical nature of property involved; "we deal here with wages-a
specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our eco-
nomic system. 71 From this language it has been argued that
• .. [TIhe prejudgment garnishment of wages produces greater
hardship than the prejudgment garnishment or attachment of other
forms of property. The former apparently meets the relaxed stand-
ards of due process as long as an opportunity to be heard is pro-
vided before the taldng of the property becomes final.72
This dispute over whether Sniadach should be limited to prejudg-
ment garnishment of wages was taken up in the courts with inconsistent
results. Arizona has confined Sniadach to wage attachment, 7 while
Wisconsin has applied the rationale to other kinds of property.7 4 Cal-
ifornia has followed Wisconsin by clearly rejecting the theory that
Sniadach should be limited to the narrow question of the unconstitutional
seizure of wages. "The principle that an individual must be afforded
notice and an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any
significant property interest. . ."5 has been extended into other areas
of California statutory law.
In Klim v. Jones,76 a federal court struck California's Baggage Lien
Law. Prior to the decision, Civil Code Section 1861 allowed a landlord
a lien upon his tenant's personal property located on the premises for
unpaid charges, primarily rent. Because Section 17861 failed "to pro-
vide for any sort of hearing prior to the imposition of the innkeepers
lien thereunder, thus depriving the boarder of property without due
pr6cess of law,"'77 the court found the section constitutionally infirm.
Following this decision, the Supreme Court of California, in a unani-
mous decision, found California's claim and delivery statute78 unconsti-
71. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
72. Hawkland, Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages After Sniadach, 75 CoM.
L.J. 5 (1970).
73. Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 105 Ariz. 270, 467
P.2d 8 (1969).
74. Larson v. Fetherstone, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
75. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 541 (1971).
76. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
77. Id. at 122.
78. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §509-521.
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tutional.70 One of the bases for this decision was that the "seizure of
the property -under the claim and delivery law constitutes a taking
without due process of law."8' 0
This far reaching trend was extended further in Randone. Expressly
pointing out that "the constitutional principles underlying Sniadach are
not confined to wage garnishment,"' Justice Tobriner settled the dis-
pute in California. He focused attention instead on the susbstantive
rights guaranteed by the due process clause. His main objections were
three:
1. Section 537, subdivision 1, permits the initial attachment of
all of a debtor's property without affording the individual either
notice of the attachment or a prior hearing to contest the at-
tachment.82
2. Section 537, subdivision 1, is not narrowly drawn to confine
[prejudgment] attachments to those "extraordinary situations"
which require "special protection to a state or creditor in-
terest."8 3
3. Section 537, subdivision 1, is drafted so broadly that it permits
the attachment of a debtor's "necessities of life" prior to a
hearing upon the validity of the creditor's claim.84
The opinion concludes that Section 537(1) is so overbroad that "this
court cannot properly undertake the wholesale redrafting of the pro-
vision which is required."8' 5 However,
We do not doubt that a constitutionally valid prejudgment attach-
ment statute, which exempts 'necessities' from its operation, can
be drafted by the Legislature to permit attachment generally af-
ter notice and a hearing on the probable validity of a creditor's
claim . .. [citation omitted] and even to permit attachment be-
fore notice in exceptional cases where, for example, the creditor
can additionally demonstrate before a magistrate that an actual
risk has arisen that assets will be concealed or that the debtor will
abscond.86
The solution thus seems obvious. Attachment after notice and a
hearing is permissible. Attachment before notice and a hearing is per-
missible in "extraordinary situations" as long as "necessities of life"
are exempted. The only remaining problem is to define "necessities
of life" and "extraordinary situations."
79. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258 (1971).
80. Id. at 277.
81. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 547 (1971).
82. Id. at 543.
83. Id. at 552.
84. Id. at 558.
85. Id. at 563.
86. Id. at 563.
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"Necessities of Life"
The opinion makes it clear that in no event will attachment of a
debtor's "necessities of life" without prior notice and hearing be jus-
tified.
...the hardship imposed on a debtor by the attachment of his
"necessities of life" is so severe that we do not believe that a cred-
itor's private interest is ever sufficient to permit the imposition of
such deprivation before notice and a hearing on the validity of
the creditor's claim.87
Moreover, it appears that the exemptions must be automatic rather
than merely claimable, as some are under the current statute.
Debtors are frequently unaware of available legal remedies, how-
ever, and, as we recently recognized in McCallop, even if they
were, 'while awaiting hearing upon ... [their] claims . ..of ex-
emption . ..defendant[s] ...with famil[ies] to support could
undergo the extreme hardship empasized in Sniadach [citation
ommitted].88
The opinions also makes a valiant effort to indicate the extent of the
exemptions required by due process. Citing a student comment, the
court said: "'attachment of any asset critical to the debtor's immediate
well-being exerts the same type of pressure as does wage garnish-
ment.' "89 Among such assets, the court mentions bank accounts com-
posed of the earnings of the debtor,90 "'television sets, refrigerators,
stoves, sewing machines and furniture of all kinds,' "D accounts re-
ceivable, 2 the debtor's dwelling,93 and his clothing and other per-'
sonal possessions. 94 It appears that "necessities of life" would parallel
current exemption statutes 5 in an expanded form, and would of course
be automatically exempt.
"Extraordinary situations"
The court also attempted to indicate the meaning of the term "ex-
traordinary situations" which was so often referred to.
Although the kind of 'extraordinary situation' that may justify
summary deprivation cannot be precisely defined, three decisions
involving such situations cited by the majority in Sniadach give
87. Id. at 558.
88. Id. at 562-563.
89. Id. at 560.
90. Id. at 559.
91. Id. at 560.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 561.
95. CAL. CODE Cv. PRoc. §690 et seq.
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some indication of the type of countervailing interests that have
been found sufficient in past cases. Both Fahey v. Mallone, [ci-
tiation omitted] and Coffin Bros. v. Bennet, [citation omitted] en-
tailed the validity of summary procedures permitting specialized
governmental officers to react immediately to serious financial
difficulties of a banking institution by seizing operational control
of the bank's assets.
In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., [citation omitted] the
general public interest at stake was even more compelling than
in the banking cases, for the challenged procedure permitted the
federal Food and Drug Administrator summarily to seize mis-
branded drugs which the administrator had probable cause to be-
lieve endangered health or would mislead consumers. 96
The court identified a number of factors in the three cases which coa-
lesced to justify the resort to summary procedures. 97  Then the court
turned to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction as an "extraordinary situation."
. . . [Tihe Sniadach court did cite, apparently with approval, one
other case, Ownbey v. Morgan, [citation omitted] which involved
neither extreme public urgency nor the built-in governmental pro-
tections noted above. In Ownbey the court found constitutional a
state statute permitting the prejudgment attachment of property of
a nonresident by a resident creditor.98
The court felt that the "public interest served by such 'quasi-in-rem'
attachment does not seem as strong as that involved in the cases dis-
cussed above . . ." but that it could be justified "under the notions
of jurisdictional authority controlling at the time of the Ownbey de-
cision" in light of the state's interest in providing an effective remedy
against nonresidents.99
96. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 553 (1971).
97. First, the seizures were undertaken to benefit the general public rather
than to serve the interests of a private individual or a single class of in-
dividuals. Second, the procedures could only be initiated by an authorized
governmental official, charged with a public responsibility, who might reason-
ably be expected to proceed only to serve the general welfare and not to se-
cure private advantage. Third, in each case the nature of the risks required
immediate action, and any delay occasioned by a prior hearing could poten-
tially have caused serious harm to the public. Fourth, the property appro-
priated did not vitally touch an individual's life or livelihood. Finally, the
'takings' were conducted under narrowly drawn statutes that sanctioned the
summary procedure only when great necessity actually arose.
Id. at 554.
98. Id.
99. Did Randone approve attachment as a means of securing quasi-in-rem juris-
diction in light of today's long-arm statutes? The Los Angeles County Council has
taken the position that subdivisions 2 and 3 of §537 are still valid, permitting attach-
ment for jurisdictional purposes. The California Law Revision Commission apparently
feels that the entire statute has been struck down (supra, note 5). I have taken Pro-
fessor Riesenfeld's position that it is still available when jurisdiction under the long-
arm statutes is not. The question, however, cannot be considered as definitely settled.
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The creditor in Randone advanced two further arguments. First,
without summary attachment
• . . [C]reditors will find it more difficult and more expensive to
collect their debts; consequently they will be obligated to raise credit
rates and to terminate the extension of credit to certain higher
credit risk individuals. Such a consequence, plaintiff argues, will
work to the detriment of the public interest in liberalized credit.' 00
The court rejected this argument because the assertion was unproven;
because even if it were proven, there was no demonstration that such
credit practices serve the "general public interest"; and finally because
the assertion was implicitly rejected in Sniadach.110
The second argument advanced by the creditor was that prejudgment
attachment may "be justified by the interest in preventing a debtor
from absconding with, or concealing, all his property as soon as he is
notified of a pending action."'01 2  The court recognized !hat this was
a very real danger, but rejected the argument since Section 537(1)
was not limited to such an extraordinary situation, and, indeed, did not
even require such an allegation. 0 3
In summary, the court indicated three "extraordinary situations"
which might justify summary attachment.
1. Where the "general public interest" was threatened by immedi-
ate harm according to the factors quoted above.
2. For purposes of securing quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
3. Where there is a threat of concealment of assets, or of the debtor's
absconding.
It is interesting to note that these situations more closely parallel
attachment statutes in other jurisdictions. "Foreign attachment" to se-
cure quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is permissible. "Domestic attachment"
is also allowable, but only in the narrower situation where fraudulent
conduct on the part of the debtor justifies it. In fact, California's
broad definition of "domestic attachment" on any contract appears to
have been the main target of Randone.
"Taking"
Randone hints of an alternative to the approach outlined above of
defining "necessities of life" and "extraordinary situations." This al-
ternative approach would eliminate the "taking" aspect of attachment,
thereby avoiding due process problems.
100. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 555 (1971).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 556.
103. Id. at 556, 557.
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The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded
[an individual] is influenced by the extent to which he may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss' [citation omitted] and depends
upon whether the [individual's] interest in avoiding that loss out-
weighs the government interest in summary adjudication (em-
phasis added).
Thus, the greater the deprivation an individual will suffer by the
attachment of property, the greater the public urgency must be to
justify the imposition of that loss on an individual before notice
and a hearing, and the more substantial the procedural safeguards
that must be afforded when such notice and hearing are required.10 4
Summary attachment violates due process because there is a "taking"
of the debtor's property. Justice Tobiner appears to have adopted
the view of Justice Harlan in Sniadach that this "taking" consists of
the deprivation, which cannot be characterized as de minimis, of the
use of the debtor's property.10 5 If this use were not interfered with,
or were only minimally interfered with, due process objections could
be avoided. As an example, the opinion hints in a footnote that the
"taking" involved in attaching real estate might be de minimis since
the deprivation of use is frequently "less severe."' 1 6
Ownership is classically a collection of rights to use and enjoy
property, to the exclusion of others. 0 7 Presumably included in this
bundle of rights are the narrow rights to conceal and dispose of prop-
erty. If a way could be found to temporarily curtail these rights, pend-
ing a hearing, it is certainly arguable that this interference, when prop-
erly justified by countervailing rights, could be characterized as a de
minimis taking, thus avoiding due process problems.
A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
Any remedial legislation should be patterned after the statutes au-
thorizing the issuance of temporary restraining orders.' 0 8 In addition
to authorizing attachment to secure quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, sum-
mary attachment could be authorized when the threat of conceal-
ment or absconding exists, peiding a noticed hearing within a reason-
ably short time.
This procedure has several advantages:
1. It utilizes currently existing procedures already familiar to attor-
neys;
104. Id. at 558.
105. Id. at 552.
106. Id.
107. CAL. CIV. CODE §654; BLAcK's LAW DICriONAPY 1260 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
108. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §527 et seq.
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2. Because the debtor would merely be prevented from hypothe-
cating or concealing his assets for a reasonably short period of time
prior to the hearing, the interference with his use and thus the "taking"
would be minimal;
3. The attachment would issue only -upon a showing of a threat of
removal or hypothecation. Thus, besides avoiding a "taking," it would
issue in an "extraordinary situation;"
4. The debtor would have the opportunity at the hearing to show his
interest in retaining the property free of attachment, while the creditor
would be allowed to demonstrate the threat of removal, allowing the
judge to refuse the attachment if it would work an undue hardship on
the debtor;
5. Any attachment which might be issued after the hearing would
avoid the due process objections of Randone because notice and an
opportunity for a hearing would have been provided;
6. "Foreign attachment" would be allowed, but only when personal
service was not available under the long-arm statute.
The proposal would bring California into line with most other juris-
dictions, in that "domestic attachment" would be limited to situations
involving fraudulent conduct. The procedure goes even further, how-
ever, by having only a limited effect on the use of the property
because only certain rights would be interfered with and because of the
noticed hearing provision.
It should be pointed out that if the "taking" in such a procedure is un-
constitutional under Randone, then doubt is cast on the constitution-
ality of all temporary restraining orders affecting property. For each
time an individual is prohibited from selling or otherwise using his prop-
erty, his "use" is interfered with. It seems highly unlikely, however,
that the precepts of the due process clause would be extended this far,
for
. . . what is due process depends on circumstances. It varies
with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation [citation].
Its content is a function of many variables, including the nature of
the right affected .... 109
Attachment could be dispensed with altogether, limiting creditors
to the writ of execution as a post judgment remedy. This approach,
however, fails to recognize the creditor's legitimate interest in obtain-
ing security for his debt. This interest in preventing removal of a
debtor's assets prior to judgment would seem sufficiently strong to justify
109. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 558 (1971).
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protection if a constitutional means of doing so can be found.110 More-
over, abolishing attachment would leave the creditor virtually remediless
in those situations involving nonresident debtors who cannot be served
under the long-arm statutes.
For the sake of clarity, the suggested procedure is outlined in greater
detail as follows:
1. At the time of the filing of the complaint or within some reason-
able period thereafter, the creditor would be required to file a declara-
tion showing "extraordinary circumstances which require special pro-
tection to a state or creditor interest." These circumstances would in-
clude threatened removal of assets from the jurisdiction, hypothecation
of assets, and other fraudulent conduct on the part of the debtor.
2. The declaration would be presented to a judge of the court having
jurisdiction of the action, and upon good cause shown, the judge would
issue an order requiring the debtor to show cause why his property,
describing it, should not be attached.
3. The hearing on the order to show cause should be set within
five to ten days after its issuance. The hearing should be continued
only at the request of the debtor and if the creditor is not ready to
proceed, the order to show cause should be discharged.
4. Pending the hearing of the order to show cause the debtor should
be restrained from hypothecating or concealing the property sought
to be attached, and if the hearing on the order to show cause is con-
tinued at the request of the debtor, the restraining order should con-
tinue in force pending the hearing.
5. At the time of issuing the order to show cause the judge should
require the creditor to post an undertaking which would protect the
debtor against any damages, including attorney fees incurred by him
by reason of the restraining order should the order to show cause be
discharged.
6. If upon the hearing to show cause, the judge determines that it is
a proper case for an attachment to issue, he may order the writ to
issue upon the creditor posting an undertaking to protect the debtor
from all damages, including attorney fees, incurred by him should
the action be dismissed.
7. If upon the hearing to show cause, the judge determines that it is
not a proper case for an attachment to issue, he shall order the order to
show cause to be discharged and direct the clerk not to issue a writ of
attachment until the further order of the court.
110. See 22 STAN. L. Rnv., supra note 50 at 158.
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8. A specific section would authorize attachment ex parte where
the debtor is a nonresident or has concealed himself within the juris-
diction, and cannot be reached under the long-arm statute.
9. Finally, current exemptions would be expanded and made au-
tomatic.
CONCLUSION
Several matters remain unresolved by Randone. As already in-
dicated, it is not entirely clear that Randone has approved attachment
to secure quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 1 I
One further unresolved matter relates to actions for the price of a
particular piece of property. Code of Civil Procedure Section 690.52
provides that property otherwise exempt from execution is not exempt
from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its price or from a
judgment of foreclosure of a -mortgage or other lien thereon. It is
arguable that the interests involved when the property is attached in
an action for its price are entirely different than those in an action in
which any property is sought as security for a cause of action un-
related to the property. It seems likely, however, that the same due
process protections would have to be extended, for California has held
that they are required even when the seller retains a security interest
in the property.112
Another closely 'related issue is whether the fact that the buyer ob-
tained the property initially through fraud could be an "extraordinary
situation" justifying prejudgment attachment. As already noted,1 "
some other states authorize attachment not only when the debtor
threatens to abscond or conceal his property, but also when he ob-
tained the property fraudulently. It would seem that the seller's basic
interest of obtaining security for a possible money judgment is the
same as in any other attachment situation. It can be argued, however,
that the debtor's previous fraudulent conduct indicates the likelihood
that he will again fraudulently dispose of the property. Moreover,
if perishables are involved, the creditor's interest in converting the
perishables into more durable assets during the pendency of the ac-
tion seems sufficiently strong. In either case, there are valid argu-
ments that an "extraordinary situation" exists.
It is imperative that a constitutional statute be enacted to protect a
creditor's legitimate interest in obtaining security for debts owed him.
In today's highly mobile society it is an easy matter for a debtor to
111. See note 99, supra,
112. See note 79, supra and accompanying text.
113. See text, Attachment in Other Jurisdictions, supra.
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abscond or conceal property and avoid his just debts. Where such a
threat exists, the creditor should be protected by a narrowly-drawn at-
tachment statute. The California supreme court decision in Randone
should not be interpreted to mean all prejudgment attachments are
void.
